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Abstract
A large, but inconclusive, literature addresses how economic heterogeneity affects the use of local resources and
local environmental quality. One line of thought, which derives from Nash equilibrium provision of public goods,
suggests that in contexts in which individual actions degrade local environmental quality, wealthier people in a
community will tend to do more to protect environmental quality. In this paper we report on experiments performed
in rural Colombia that were designed to explore the role that economic inequality plays in the ‘provision’ of local
environmental quality. Subjects were asked to decide how much time to devote to collecting firewood from a local
forest, which degrades local water quality, and how much to unrelated pursuits. Economic heterogeneity was
introduced by varying the private returns to these alternative pursuits. Consistent with the Nash equilibrium
prediction, we found that the players with more valuable alternative options put less pressure on local water quality.
However, the subjects with less valuable alternative options showed significantly more restraint relative to their pure
Nash strategies. Furthermore, they were willing to bear significantly greater opportunity costs to move their groups
to outcomes that yielded higher average payoffs and better water quality than the Nash equilibrium outcome. © 2002
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Many rural communities in the developing
world depend to a large degree on access to local
natural resources and on local environmental
quality. A large body of literature has emerged
that addresses how economic heterogeneity—in-
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equality of wealth, income, or economic opportu-
nity within a community—affects the use of local
resources and environmental quality. Taken as a
whole, this literature is inconclusive (Varughese
and Ostrom, 2001; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson,
2002). One line of thought, however, originates
with Olson’s (Olson, 1965) well-known hypothesis
that wealthier people in a group will tend to take
on a larger share of providing a public good than
their poorer counterparts. Refining Olson’s hy-
pothesis, Bergstrom et al. (1986) suggested that
this effect is enhanced by greater income inequal-
ity.1 These results suggest the hypothesis that in
contexts in which individual actions degrade local
environmental quality, the wealthier members of
the community will do more to protect local
environmental resources than their poorer neigh-
bors because they will limit their damaging ac-
tions to a greater extent. Greater inequality
suggests a further shift of the burden of environ-
mental protection to the wealthier members of a
community.2
The theoretical predictions of how income in-
equality affects the provision of public goods are
generated from models of Nash non-cooperative
behavior; that is, using the standard assumption
of purely self-interested strategic behavior. How-
ever, we know from a wealth of experimental
literature that subjects in experiments involving
public goods do not typically play purely self-in-
terested strategies.3 Rather, they make choices
that seem to balance pure self-interests against
group interests. Consequently, groups of individu-
als in public good environments tend to achieve
more efficient outcomes than Nash equilibrium
outcomes.
In this paper we report on experiments we
designed to explore the role that economic in-
equality plays in the ‘provision’ of local environ-
mental quality in the developing world. Rather
than test Nash equilibrium predictions about how
economic inequality affects local environmental
quality, we explore burden sharing in achieving
better-than-Nash equilibrium outcomes. Specifi-
cally, we ask the question of whether the richer
members of a community do more than their
poorer neighbors to help the community escape
the adverse welfare and environmental effects of
purely self-interested strategic behavior, or
whether it is the other way around.
Our experiments were performed in three rural
areas of Colombia. The areas were chosen be-
cause villagers in each region have significant
interests in local natural resources and environ-
mental quality. In fact, the experiments were de-
signed to approximate an environmental quality
problem that rural villagers in developing coun-
tries are likely to face. Subjects were asked to
decide how much time to devote to collecting
firewood from a local forest, and how much to
devote to an alternative market pursuit such as
wage labor or farming one’s own land. Time spent
collecting firewood has adverse environmental
consequences because it leads to soil erosion and
worsened local water quality due to increased
sedimentation. The public goods aspect of the
problem is that individual restraint in firewood
collection improves water quality, which is a
benefit shared by all in the community.4
1 They also show that an income redistribution from poorer
individuals to wealthier individuals will lead to increased pro-
vision of a public good if the redistribution leads more of the
poorer members of a community to choose to freeride com-
pletely on the contributions of their richer neighbors. Experi-
mental tests of this hypothesis by Chan et al. (1996) offer some
support. On the other hand, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
predicted that a small redistribution of income—small enough
so that the set of contributors to a public good is not
changed—would not affect aggregate contributions. Chan et
al. (1999) test and reject this hypothesis.
2 Sandler (1992) notes that the link between income inequal-
ity and the provision of a public good proposed by Olson and
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian is sensitive to assumptions
about preferences for the public good, the technology that
characterizes provision of the good, and the exact form of
strategic interaction.
3 For a review of this literature, see Ledyard (1995).
4 While we chose to place our subjects in a public good
environment, many local resource dilemmas in the developing
world are better characterized as common pool resource prob-
lems. Since public good models are structurally different from
common pool models, one should be cautious about using our
results about burden-sharing in the provision of local environ-
mental quality to draw conclusions about local use of a
common pool resource. Further research that extends our
approach to examine burden-sharing in the exploitation of
common pool resources will likely yield valuable insights.
While subjects faced symmetric private returns
from time spent collecting firewood and symmet-
ric shared costs from water quality degradation,
economic heterogeneity was introduced by vary-
ing the private returns to the alternative market
pursuit.5 Two treatments of the experiment were
administered—one in which the subjects faced
different returns in the market, and the other in
which subjects faced symmetric returns to this
alternative. The model that we used to generate
the payoffs for the experiments was constructed
so that average returns to the market alternative
(per unit of effort) are the same in both the
symmetric and asymmetric treatments. More im-
portantly, the Nash equilibria of the two treat-
ments yield the same aggregate amount of time
spent collecting firewood, and hence, local water
quality. However, individual Nash equilibrium
choices differ in the two treatments. Consistent
with the prediction of Olson and Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian, individual equilibrium choices
in the symmetric treatment are also symmetric,
but in the equilibrium of the asymmetric game,
the high-wage players— those with more valuable
alternative market options—are predicted to
show more restraint in exploiting the local forest,
thereby doing more to protect local water quality
than their less advantaged neighbors.6
Each group of subjects played a number of
rounds of the game without being able to commu-
nicate with others in their group, and then contin-
ued to play additional rounds in which they were
allowed to engage in non-binding and non-threat-
ening communication between rounds. Allowing
subjects to communicate with each other was
motivated by the fact that many local environ-
mental and natural resource dilemmas are ad-
dressed through cooperative efforts by local
residents (Ostrom, 2000). Moreover, an over-
whelming amount of experimental evidence sug-
gests that face-to-face communication is effective
in enhancing cooperation in experiments of this
type (Hackett et al., 1994; Ostrom et al., 1994;
Ledyard, 1995).
The results of our experiments yield intriguing
insights about burden-sharing in the provision of
local environmental quality. As predicted by the
equilibrium of our asymmetric game, the high-
wage players spent less time harvesting firewood
than their poorer counterparts, thereby putting
less pressure on local water quality. As expected,
however, the subjects did not choose pure Nash
strategies. Across the board the groups achieved
outcomes with higher average payoffs and better
water quality than the equilibrium predictions,
thereby setting the stage for exploring burden-
sharing in achieving these more efficient out-
comes. Our results from this exploration are
unequivocal. By calculating the differences be-
tween individuals’ actual choices and their Nash
best-responses, we found that although the high-
wage players put less pressure on local environ-
mental quality, their choices ultimately were quite
close to their Nash best-responses. On the other
hand, the low-wage players showed significantly
more restraint relative to their Nash best-re-
sponses. Thus, the restraint necessary for these
groups to achieve better-than-Nash equilibrium
outcomes came largely from the low-wage sub-
jects. Furthermore, by calculating individuals’
foregone payoffs from not playing pure Nash
strategies, we found that the low-wage players
were, on average, willing to bear significantly
greater opportunity costs than their richer coun-
terparts to help their groups achieve better-than-
Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Face-to-face communication only enhanced the
willingness of the low-wage subjects to bear the
costs of moving their groups to more efficient
outcomes. In fact, this was the main effect of
communication, since through these rounds of the
5 In real settings, these returns may vary for a number of
reasons, including unequal land ownership, access to credit, or
differences in education levels. Of course, there are other
dimensions of economic inequality. The typical public goods
model would focus on differences in exogenous income
(Bergstrom et al., 1986; Chan et al., 1996, 1999). Others have
focused on asset inequality (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson,
2002). For a set of common pool experiments, Hackett et al.
(1994) vary the exogenous endowment of an input across
individuals. Whether our results will hold along other dimen-
sions of economic inequality is a question for future research.
6 One should be clear that we are not proposing this result
as a general statement about Nash equilibrium provision of
environmental quality in the developing world, only that it is
consistent with one line of thought in the literature.
experiment the high-wage subjects stuck close to
their Nash best-responses. Not surprisingly, these
groups fared much better when they were allowed
to communicate between rounds than when they
were not.
Not only do our results suggest that economic
asymmetry plays an important role in the manner
in which groups share the burden of achieving
better-than-Nash equilibrium outcomes, they also
suggest that heterogeneity may have an important
role in determining aggregate outcomes that go
unrecognized in models of purely self-interested
provision of a public good. Even though aggre-
gate levels of exploitation of the local forests were
predicted to be the same for both treatments, the
groups with unequal market wages put signifi-
cantly less pressure on local environmental quality
than the groups with symmetric market returns.
While the subjects in our symmetric treatment
also did not choose pure Nash strategies, and
achieved better outcomes in doing so, on average
they did not assume as large a burden of moving
their groups to more efficient outcomes as the
low-wage subjects in the asymmetric treatment
did for their groups. Consequently, the heteroge-
neous groups consistently enjoyed higher levels of
environmental quality than their homogeneous
counterparts.
2. Experimental design
As noted in the introduction, we designed our
experiments to confront our subjects with a local
environmental quality problem that would closely
mimic their actual experiences. Toward that end,
our field experiments were undertaken in three
rural areas in Colombia where villagers have sig-
nificant interests in local natural resources and
environmental quality. Payoffs for the games were
generated from a model of individual efforts to
collect firewood from local forests. Higher levels
of effort devoted to firewood extraction leads to
greater erosion and sedimentation of local water
supplies; thus, restraint in harvesting firewood
from local forests generates the pure public good
of better water quality.
2.1. The payoffs
A simple model of a fixed number of individu-
als who exploit a local forest for firewood gener-
ated the payoffs for our experiments. In each
round of the games, each individual was given an
endowment of time e, of which all or part could
be allocated to collecting firewood. Let xi denote
the amount of time individual i spends collecting
firewood. This effort yields a private benefit,
which we assume takes the quadratic form
g(xi)=xi−(xi)2/2, where  and  are strictly
positive and are chosen in part to guarantee
g(xi)0, for xi [1, e ]. The strict concavity of
g(xi) indicates diminishing marginal private re-
turns to time spent collecting firewood.
Alternatively, the individual could allocate his
or her labor to an alternative market pursuit such
as wage labor or farming one’s land. Let wi
denote the individual’s return to time devoted to
the market alternative. Henceforth, we refer to
this return as the market wage. In one experimen-
tal treatment this wage will vary among individu-
als in a group, while in the other treatment all
individuals in a group will face the same market
wage. Note that i ’s decision to provide (e−xi)
units of labor to the market alternative yields a
payoff of wi× (e−xi).
Subjects were told explicitly that their decision
to spend time extracting firewood would affect
water quality in the area adversely. We assumed
that water quality q is a quadratic function of the
aggregate amount of time individuals in the com-
munity spend collecting firewood; specifically,
q( xj)=q0− ( xj)2/2, where q0 is interpreted to
be water quality in the absence of firewood ex-
traction. The value of q0 was chosen, in part, to
guarantee q( xj)0 for all feasible  xj.
Define ui(xi,  xj)=q( xj)+g(xi)+wi× (e−
xi). Parameters were chosen, in part, to guarantee
that ui(xi,  xj)0 for all possible xi and  xj. To
facilitate scaling individual payoffs, we take an
individual’s payoff function to be a positive,
monotonic transformation F of u. In particular,
F(ui)=k× (ui), where k and  are positive con-
stants. An individual’s payoff function is then,
Ui(xi,  xj)=k× [ f( xj)+g(xi)+w× (e−xi)]
=k×

q0−
( xj)2
2

+

xi−
(xi)2
2

+wi× (e−xi)

. (1)
Each group consisted of n=8 subjects, and
each subject was allocated e=8 units of time in
each round. Pre-testing of the experimental de-
signs at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst
and the Humboldt Institute for Biodiversity in
Villa de Leyva, Colombia, led us to denominate
units of time as months per year. Scale concerns
led us to choose the following remaining parame-
ter values: k=4/16 810, q0=1372.8, =97.2;
=3.2, and =2. Therefore:
By varying the market wage rate, we generated
two treatments of the experiment. For the base-
line case we assumed that wi=30 for each of the
eight individuals in a symmetric-wage group. For
the other treatment we assigned a lower market
wage, wi=20, to six members of a asymmetric-
wage group, and a higher wage, wi=60, for the
other two members. Note that average market
wages are the same for the symmetric-wage and
asymmetric-wage groups.
Subjects were given a table of payoffs generated
by Eq. (2). Table 1 is a slightly shortened version
of the payoff table given to each of the subjects in
the symmetric market wage treatment (the bottom
seven rows are deleted here to conserve space. The
shaded cells indicate an individual’s pure Nash
strategy. The subjects received complete tables
without the shading). Tables 2 and 3 are short-
ened versions of the payoff tables given to the
high-wage and low-wage subjects, respectively, in
the asymmetric-wage treatment.
2.2. Nash strategies and the balance between
self-interested and group-oriented behaior
The treatments were designed to generate the
same aggregate amount of time devoted to fire-
wood harvesting in the two Nash equilibria, al-
though individual equilibrium choices would be
different. The Nash equilibrium of the symmetric
market wage game is for each of the eight players
to spend 6 months collecting firewood. In this
equilibrium, each subject receives 155 points. In
the equilibrium of the asymmetric market wage
game, the high-wage subjects are predicted to
spend no time collecting firewood, choosing in-
stead to devote all of their time to the alternative
market pursuit. On the other hand, the low-wage
subjects are predicted to devote all of their en-
dowment of 8 months to collecting firewood.7
Consistent with the predictions of Olson (1965)
and Bergstrom et al. (1986), in the asymmetric-
Ui(xi,  xj)= 4168101372.8− ( xj)22 +97.2xi−3.2(xi)22 +wi× (8−xi)2. (2)
7 One may verify that these choices constitute Nash equi-
libria from the payoff tables. Recall that in a Nash equilibrium
each player’s choice has to be a best-response to all the other
players’ choices. Consider first the symmetric market wage
treatment in which each player is predicted to spend 6 months
collecting firewood. From Table 1, if each of seven of the eight
players chooses 6 months for a total of 42, then the best-re-
sponse of the eighth player is to choose 6 months. Now
consider the equilibrium of the asymmetric-wage treatment in
which the high wage players choose to spend no time collect-
ing firewood, while each of the low-wage players devote all of
their 8 months to collecting firewood. Using Table 2— the
payoffs for a high-wage player in this treatment—note that in
the proposed equilibrium the choices of all low-wage players
and the other high-wage player sum to 48 months. A high-
wage player’s best-response is, therefore, to spend no time
collecting firewood. For a low-wage player, the sum of the
other players’ choices in the proposed equilibrium is 40
months. From Table 3, a low-wage player’s best-response is to
spend 8 months collecting firewood.
Table 1
Individual payoffs and Nash responses for symmetric-wage subjects
Table 2
Individual payoffs and Nash responses for high-wage subjects in asymmetric-wage treatment
Table 3
Individual payoffs and Nash responses for low-wage subjects in asymmetric-wage treatment
wage treatment the high-wage subjects are ex-
pected to take on a disproportionate burden of
protecting local water quality. In this asymmetric
equilibrium, low-wage subjects receive 191 points,
while the high-wage subjects receive only 117
points. In both the symmetric and asymmetric-
wage treatments, aggregate equilibrium time spent
collecting firewood is 48 months.8
Although Nash equilibrium choices are a stan-
dard benchmark for games of this type, we are
more interested in analyzing off-equilibrium
choices and comparing these to individuals’ pure
Nash strategies; that is, their payoff-maximizing
choices, given the choices of others in their group.
In fact, we take the difference between an indi-
vidual’s Nash best-response to the choices of the
other subjects in his or her group and his or her
actual choices to be an indicator of how that
person balances self-interests against the interests
of the entire group.
To illustrate our approach, consider the payoffs
for an individual in our symmetric-wage treat-
ment provided in Table 1. Recall that each exper-
iment involved eight participants. Suppose that
each of seven players chooses to spend 2 months
collecting firewood from local forests. Since these
subjects are choosing to spend 14 months in total
collecting firewood, Table 1 indicates that the
eighth player’s Nash best-response is to spend 8
months collecting firewood. This choice is made
purely out of self-interest without regard for the
welfare of the others in the group. Note that
player eight’s payoff in this outcome is 776 points,
while each of the other seven receive 535 points
(each player chooses 2 months, while the sum of
the others’ choices is 20 months).
Now imagine that the eighth player chooses 3
months instead of 8, while the other seven sub-
jects continue to choose 2 months. This is a
significantly more group-oriented choice— it is
costly because the eighth player’s payoff is now
652 points instead of 776; however, each of the
other players’ payoffs increase from 535 points to
606 (each continues to choose 2 months, but the
sum of the others’ choices is now 15 months).
With a choice of 3 months instead of 8, the eighth
player bears a personal opportunity cost of 124
points to increase the payoffs to the others in the
group by 497 points! Much of our analysis of the
experimental data in the next section is based
upon the differences between the subjects’ actual
choices and their Nash best-responses: choices
that are close to Nash responses indicate relatively
self-interested behavior, while those that are fur-
ther away indicate stronger group-regarding
behavior.
2.3. The subjects and experiments
As noted before, we intended our experiments
to confront subjects with an environmental prob-
lem that closely mimicked their actual experi-
ences. Our field experiments were undertaken in
three rural areas in Colombia. In the village of
Encino, located in the eastern Andean region,
residents extract firewood and log timber on a
small scale in local tropical cloud forests. Water
for consumption and irrigation comes nearly un-
treated from local rivers. Of the three areas that
we visited, the relationship between forest cover
and water quality is most critical in Encino, and
the residents of this village are acutely aware of
the problem. Water quality degradation caused by
forest cover losses is less severe in the villages of
Circasia and Filandia in the Quindio coffee region
in the mid-Andes, but nevertheless is a significant
problem. In Quindio, subjects for our experiments
were drawn specifically from a group of families
whose livelihood is related to the extraction and
processing of natural fibers from local forests. As
in Encino, water is drawn from local rivers, and
residents are aware that extracting forest products
8 The other common benchmark for games of this type is the
welfare maximizing outcomes. Although this benchmark is not
very useful for our purposes, it is interesting to note how poorly
the subjects fare in the Nash equilibria, relative to what is
possible. It is easy to show that in the efficient outcome of the
symmetric-wage game, each player would choose to spend only
1 month harvesting firewood and would receive a payoff of 645
points. This is more than four times greater than the Nash
equilibrium payoffs. Efficiency in the asymmetric-wage treat-
ment would require the high-wage players to forego spending
time collecting firewood, and the low-wage players to spend only
1 month collecting firewood. In this outcome the high-wage
players would receive 801 points, about 6.8 time greater than
their Nash equilibrium payoffs, and the low-wage players would
receive 602 points, or just over three times their Nash payoffs.
can lead to lower water quality. In Nuqui, located
on the Pacific coast, villagers harvest coastal man-
groves for firewood and other wood products, but
their water comes from further inland; hence, they
do not experience a direct link between their
exploitation of local sources of wood and water
quality. However, they face a similar dilemma
because their exploitation of the mangroves for
wood adversely affects coastal fish populations
upon which also they depend.
In total, 120 subjects participated in the experi-
ments. The subjects were distributed into 15 groups,
10 of which played the symmetric-wage treatment,
and five the asymmetric-wage treatment. In the case
of the asymmetric-wage treatment, the assignment
of high-wage and low-wage payoff tables was done
randomly. In each of the three settings, the partic-
ipants generally knew each other well, having lived
in the same village for most of their lives (we avoided
having close relatives in the same group). Schooling,
age and income levels varied significantly within
each group. Most participants had fewer than 6
years of schooling, roughly half were between 30
and 50 years old, and all were 16 or older.
Each session of the experiment involved eight
subjects and two monitors. The subjects sat at
individual desks that were distributed in a circle
with enough separation between the desks so they
could not look at another’s work. Except in periods
when communication was allowed, the desks faced
away from the center of the circle. In each round,
each subject would choose how many units of time,
between zero and eight, to spend collecting fire-
wood. Subjects were given a payoff table and large
posters of these tables were placed on a wall of the
‘field lab’. In the symmetric-wage treatment, indi-
viduals knew that the other participants consulted
the same table. In the asymmetric-wage treatment,
individuals knew how many high-wage and low-
wage players there were, but not which individuals,
other than themselves, were low-wage and high-
wage players. Although individuals could not know
in advance the decisions of others, they knew the
payoffs upon which their decisions were based.
Once a subject made a decision for a particular
round, this decision was written on a slip of paper
in private. When all subjects had made their
decisions, a monitor collected each slip of paper and
gave them to another monitor who recorded the
decisions and calculated the total for the group. This
total was announced to the subjects, who then
determined their own payoffs from their payoff
tables. Subjects kept a record of their own payoffs
as a check on the monitor’s record.
Each session began with welcoming remarks
within which the subjects were told that the session
would last approximately 2 hours. A monitor then
read the instructions to the participants (the instruc-
tions are available from the authors). Results from
pre-tests of the experiment led us to decide not to
give the subjects written instructions because of the
wide variation in levels of literacy. The instructions
explained the basic setting of the game, how points
were earned, how these points were converted to
cash at the end of the session, and the procedures
of the game. The instructions included three differ-
ent examples to familiarize the subjects with the
payoffs and the procedures. Two practice rounds
were conducted. The monitor asked for questions
at several points, and when there were no further
questions the game began with round 1. In addition
to posters of the payoff tables, large posters of the
forms the subjects used during the game and the
examples from the instructions were placed on one
wall of the ‘field lab’.
Each of the 15 groups played 8–11 initial rounds
of the game without being allowed to communicate
with the others in their group or with the monitors.
The subjects were not told how many rounds would
be played in the initial stage, or that the rules for
communication would be changed at some point.
After the initial rounds the monitors stopped the
game and announced a new set of rules for the
forthcoming rounds. A monitor read from a new
poster, which was subsequently placed on the wall,
announcing that from now on the individuals in a
group would be allowed 5 minutes of discussion
between rounds. Their discussions could be about
anything, but they could not threaten each other or
agree to transfers of cash or points after the session.
Between rounds the subjects turned their desks to
face each other. Once 5 minutes elapsed, the subjects
were required to turn their desks back around to
make their decisions in private. The groups played
in this way for another 9–12 rounds, again without
knowing when the final round would be.
Fig. 1. Average months harvesting firewood.
At the end of each session, total points for each
individual were calculated, and they were paid that
number in pesos for their participation. Each
individual also received a gift (a common house-
hold item such as a lamp, table set, machete, etc.)
for participation, which was not related to their
play during the experiments. For the villages in
which the experiments were conducted, a daily
minimum wage centered around 7000 pesos (about
US $5.40 at the time). The average payoff (includ-
ing payoffs for practice rounds) was, as planned,
about 1.5 days of work at the local minimum wage.
3. Results
We begin the analysis of the experimental data
by considering average choices of time spent har-
vesting firewood. Fig. 1 and the first block of
rows in Table 4 summarize these decisions. As
indicated earlier, we ended the first and second
stages at different points so that the subjects
could not anticipate the terminal rounds. All
groups played 8–11 rounds in the first stage,
within which they were not able to communicate
with each other. We, therefore, consider only the
first eight rounds of first-stage decisions for each
group. All groups played nine rounds in the sec-
ond stage in which they were allowed to commu-
nicate with each other between rounds, and some
a few more; therefore, we consider only the first
nine rounds of second-stage decisions for each
group.
Let us focus first on the high-wage and low-
wage players’ choices in the asymmetric payoff
treatment. After the initial round in which aver-
age choices for both types of players were between
4 and 5 months harvesting firewood, there is a
large separation of average time spent harvesting
firewood. As predicted, the high-wage players
spent less time harvesting firewood than the low-
wage players. In the first three rounds of the
no-communication stage the average choice of the
high-wage players was 3.667, while for the low-
wage players the average was 4.767. This differ-
ence is statistically significant (P-value=0.040
from the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank sum
test— this test is used for comparing means
throughout the analysis). Both types of subjects
reduced their amounts of time collecting firewood
as the experiment proceeded through the no-com-
munication stage. The high-wage subjects reduced
their average time collecting firewood from 3.667
in the first three rounds of the no-communication
stage to 2.462 in the last three rounds (P-value=
0.084), while the low-wage subjects reduced their
average time in the forest from 4.767 in the first
three rounds to 4.128 in the last three rounds
(P-value=0.035). Notice that high-wage players
continued to exploit the local forest to a lesser
degree than low-wage players in the last three
rounds of the first stage. The difference between
their average choices, 2.462 for the high-wage
subjects as compared with 4.767 for the low-wage
subjects, remained statistically significant (P-
value=0.004).
As expected, the players put significantly less
pressure on local environmental quality when they
were allowed to communicate between rounds in
the second stage. However, the main effect of
communication was to induce the low-wage play-
ers to reduce their harvesting of firewood. From
Table 4
Summary data
Communication roundsNo-communication rounds
Rounds 6–8Rounds 1–3 Rounds 1–3 Rounds 7–9
Months in the forest
Asymmetric payoffs
2.462 2.100High wage 2.4673.667
4.128 3.2784.767 3.044Low wage
Combined 3.7124.492 2.983 2.900
4.388 3.783 3.6164.388Symmetric payoffs
Earnings
Asymmetric payoffs
$522.08 $618.80$406.63 $634.37High wage
$447.86 $503.44Low wage $498.39$347.71
$466.41 $532.28$362.44 $532.38Combined
$371.41Symmetric Payoffs $444.47$368.17 $460.14
Deiations from best-responses
Asymmetric payoffs
−2.300High wage −0.192 1.467 1.400
3.872 4.7223.233 4.956Low wage
3.224Symmetric payoffs 3.9753.146 4.223
Opportunity costs of non-Nash choices
Asymmetric payoffs
$6.85 $16.30 $18.10High wage $18.57
$74.42 $125.76$44.68 $138.99Low wage
$33.49 $58.00 $65.50Symmetric payoffs $35.61
the last three rounds of the no-communication
stage into the first three rounds of the communi-
cation stage, the low-wage players reduced their
average time spent harvesting firewood from
4.128 to 3.278 (P-value=0.035) and a bit further
to 3.044 for the last three rounds of the communi-
cation stage. On the other hand, the high-wage
players reduced their time spent harvesting fire-
wood only slightly from 2.462 in the last three
rounds of the no-communication stage to 2.100 in
the first three rounds of the communication stage.
This difference is both small and statistically in-
significant (P-value=0.492). In the last three
rounds of the communication stage, the high-
wage players’ average choices edged back up to
the same level as their average choices in the last
three rounds in the no-communication stage.
As the asymmetric-wage subjects reduced their
time spent harvesting firewood, their average
earnings improved. The second block of rows of
Table 4 indicates that in the no-communication
stage the average earnings of the high-wage sub-
jects rose from about $407 in the first three
rounds to about $522 in the last three rounds
(P-value=0.005), while the earnings of the low-
wage subjects rose from about $348 to about $448
(P-value=0.000). This continued into the com-
munication stage. Average earnings for the high-
wage players rose from $522 in the last three
rounds of the no-communication stage to nearly
$619 in the first three rounds of the communica-
tion stage (P-value=0.010), and to over $634 in
the last three rounds of this stage. The same thing
occurred for the low-wage players, but at lower
levels. Note that the subjects’ earnings were much
higher than the Nash equilibrium earnings of $117
per round for each high-wage player and $191 per
round for each low-wage player.
Now let us compare the performance of the
asymmetric-wage groups to that of the symmetric-
wage groups. Even though the payoffs were con-
structed so that the Nash equilibria of the
Fig. 2. Average deviations from Nash best-responses.
asymmetric and symmetric-wage treatments yields
the same level of aggregate time harvesting fire-
wood, and hence local water quality, on average
the asymmetric-wage groups put less pressure on
the local forest. The first block of rows of Table 4
and Fig. 1 indicate that after starting out at about
the same levels, by the last three rounds of the
no-communication stage the combined average
choices of the asymmetric-wage groups fell below
those of the symmetric-wage groups. In the last
three rounds of the no-communication stage the
asymmetric-wage subjects were averaging 3.712
units of time harvesting firewood, while the sym-
metric-wage subjects were averaging 4.388 months
harvesting firewood (P-value=0.018).
Like the subjects in the asymmetric-wage treat-
ment, the symmetric-wage subjects reduced their
exploitation of the forest when they were allowed
to communicate with each other. Their average
choices fell from 4.388 for the last three rounds of
the no-communication stage to 3.616 for the last
three rounds of the communication stage (P-
value=0.001). However, they continued to ex-
ploit the forest to a greater degree, and hence,
experience lower water quality, than their asym-
metric-wage counterparts. By the last rounds of
the communication stage, the average choices of
the asymmetric-wage subjects were 2.900 as com-
pared with 3.616 for the symmetric-wage subjects
(P-value=0.0173). Clearly, economic heterogene-
ity played a role here in producing better environ-
mental outcomes, even though the two treatments
were constructed to produce the same Nash equi-
librium levels of water quality.
Although the snapshot provided by analyzing
average choices is illuminating, it does not give us
a complete picture of how economic inequality
affects burden-sharing in achieving the outcomes
that are consistently better than Nash equilibrium
outcomes. For this we analyze the average devia-
tions of the participants’ decisions from their indi-
vidual Nash best-responses in each round. An
individual’s Nash best-response in a particular
round is his or her payoff-maximizing choice
given the actual aggregate choices of the rest of
the group in that round. We then calculated the
difference between each individual’s best-response
and their actual choice. These deviations from
Nash best-responses are summarized in Fig. 2 and
in the third block of rows in Table 4. Note that
values close to zero indicate that players made
choices that were, on average, close to pure Nash
strategies, while positive values indicate average
choices of time spent harvesting firewood that
were less than individual best-responses. These
positive deviations indicate more group-oriented
choices than purely self-interested Nash strategies,
and hence, a greater willingness to accept part of
the burden of achieving more efficient outcomes
than the Nash equilibrium outcomes.9
Focusing first on the high-wage and low-wage
players’ choices in the asymmetric payoff treat-
ment, note the large separation between the aver-
age deviations from Nash best-responses of the
two types of players throughout the sessions
(these differences are always statistically signifi-
9 One could argue that individual deviations from pure
Nash strategies could be explained, at least in part, by subjects
having a difficult time locating their best-responses. If this was
the sole reason for these deviations, we would expect that
average deviations would consistently be statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, which is not what we observe.
cant). In the first five rounds or so of the first stage,
the high-wage players’ average deviations from
their best-responses are negative, indicating that
they actually spent more time harvesting firewood
than suggested by their Nash strategies. These
choices are very inefficient— they are not individu-
ally optimal, and they are more environmentally
damaging than their Nash strategies. As the high-
wage players realized the inefficiency of their
choices, they moved to their purely self-in-
terested Nash best-responses in the last three
rounds of the first stage. The low-wage players, on
the other hand, made choices throughout the first
stage that were consistently well below their Nash
best-responses. By the last three rounds of the
no-communication stage, the low-wage players
were making choices, on average, that were nearly
4 units of time lower than their self-interested Nash
strategies would indicate.
Both types of players made significant moves
toward achieving better-than-Nash equilibrium
outcomes when they were allowed to communicate
with each other. The high-wage players’ deviations
from their Nash best-responses increased from
about zero (−0.192) in the last three rounds of the
no-communication stage to 1.467 in the first three
rounds of the communication stage (P-value=
0.057). Their average deviations from best-re-
sponses decreased slightly to 1.400 in the last three
rounds of the communication stage, but the differ-
ence between the first three rounds and the last
three rounds of this stage is not statistically signifi-
cant. Similarly, the low-wage players’ deviations
from their best-responses rose from 3.872 in the
last three rounds of the no-communication stage to
4.772 in the first three rounds when communica-
tion was allowed (P-value=0.035), and remained
at about that level through the rest of that stage.
Our comparison of the subjects’ actual choices
to their purely self-interested Nash strategies yields
a very clear message. Even though the richer
players put less pressure on the environment than
the poorer players, the poorer players made
choices that were significantly more group-ori-
ented, thus taking on the primary responsibility for
achieving outcomes that were consistently more
efficient than the Nash equilibrium outcome.
The symmetric-wage subjects also made choices
that were, on average, more group-oriented than
their pure Nash strategies. Their choices averaged
about 3.224 units of time lower than their Nash
best-responses in the last three rounds of the
no-communication stage, and fell to 4.223 units
lower by rounds 7–9 of the communication stage
(P-value=0.000). Though the symmetric-wage
players made choices that were significantly more
group-oriented than their pure Nash strategies,
they did not do so to the same extent as the
low-wage subjects in the asymmetric-wage treat-
ment, particularly in the communication rounds.
Average deviations from best-responses for the
symmetric-wage subjects in the first three rounds of
the communication stage were about 3.98, while
for the low-wage subjects in asymmetric-wage
treatment they were about 4.722 (P-value=0.021).
This separation continued for rounds 7–9 in the
communication stage—4.223 for the symmetric-
wage subjects and 4.956 for the low-wage subjects
in the asymmetric-wage treatment (P-value=
0.033). While these differences are not very large,
the fact that the low-wage subjects in the asymmet-
ric-wage groups were willing to take on more
responsibility for moving their groups to more
efficient outcomes than their symmetric-wage
counterparts is the primary reason the asymmetric-
wage groups were able to attain higher levels of
environmental quality.
Another way of looking at the distribution of the
burden of achieving better-than-Nash equilibrium
outcomes is to examine what it costs individuals to
show restraint in harvesting firewood relative to
their Nash best-responses. Toward this end, for
each individual in each round we calculated the
difference between the individual’s actual payoff
and what they would have earned had they played
their Nash best-responses instead. This calculation
indicates an individual’s personal opportunity
costs of not making a purely self-interested choice,
and hence, the costs they are willing to bear to help
their group achieve more efficient outcomes. These
opportunity costs are summarized in Fig. 3 and the
last block of rows in Table 4.
This exercise simply reinforces our finding that
the asymmetric-wage groups were able to reach
and sustain better-than-Nash equilibrium out-
comes largely because the low-wage subjects were
Fig. 3. Average opportunity costs of non-Nash choices.
willing to take on the burden of doing so. In the
last three rounds of the no-communication stage,
the low-wage subjects were bearing opportunity
costs of not making purely self-interested choices
that averaged $74.42 per subject per round, while
the opportunity costs borne by the high-wage
players were merely $6.85 (P-value=0.0001). In
the communication stage the difference is more
dramatic—$125.76 for the low-wage players in
the first three rounds of this stage as compared
with $16.30 for the high-wage subjects (P-value=
0.0001), and about $140 versus $18 for rounds
7–9 of this stage (P-value=0.0001).
Recall that from the perspective of the devia-
tions from Nash best-responses, the willingness of
the low-wage players in the asymmetric-wage
groups to make more group-oriented choices than
their symmetric-wage counterparts does not ap-
pear to be that great. However, from the perspec-
tive of the opportunity costs borne to make more
group-oriented choices, the low-wage players in
the asymmetric-groups showed significantly
greater willingness to bear the costs of moving
their groups to better-than-Nash equilibrium out-
comes than the symmetric-wage subjects. Begin-
ning in the last three rounds of the
no-communication stage and on to the end of the
sessions, the opportunity costs of making non-
Nash choices borne by the low-wage players in
the asymmetric-groups were consistently more
than twice the opportunity costs borne by the
symmetric-wage subjects (these differences in the
costs of non-Nash choices are always statistically
significant: the P-values are always around
0.0001). Again, not only were the low-wage play-
ers willing to accept the greater burden of achiev-
ing better outcomes than the high-wage subjects
in their own groups, but they also did so to a
greater extent than the subjects in the symmetric-
wage treatment.
4. Concluding remarks
This study strongly suggests that any examina-
tion of the effects of economic inequality on the
provision of shared environmental quality in rural
communities of the developing world should rec-
ognize two modes of burden-sharing. The first,
which derives from hypotheses of Olson (1965)
and Bergstrom et al. (1986), focuses on the ques-
tion of whether it is the more- or less-advantaged
members of a community who are likely to put
less pressure on the local environment. Our mod-
ification of this approach yielded the Nash equi-
librium prediction that the richer members of a
community— those with more valuable alterna-
tive options in our construct—would put less
pressure on the local environment than their less-
advantaged neighbors. Our experimental data
lend strong support to this hypothesis.
However, a single-minded focus on this mode
of burden-sharing misses an important point—
subjects in public goods environments rarely
choose pure Nash strategies, and typically achieve
more efficient outcomes in doing so. Thus, the
more important contribution of this study is to
recognize and analyze another mode of burden-
sharing; that is, the question of which individuals
are likely to bear the burden of moving their
group to these more efficient outcomes. Our re-
sults concerning this mode of burden-sharing are
unequivocal. Even though the members of our
groups with the more valuable alternative pursuits
put less pressure on the local environment, those
with less valuable options took on significantly
more of the responsibility of moving their groups
to outcomes with higher payoffs and better envi-
ronmental quality.
These results may have important policy implica-
tions for whether and how governments should
intervene in these contexts. A restriction on the use
of a resource in order to improve local environmen-
tal quality may not produce the intended outcome
if the policy is designed without regard for the way
a community attacks the problem on its own. For
example, a policy that focuses on restraining the
behavior of the less-advantaged in a community
because they tend to put more pressure on local
environmental quality might be counterproductive
if doing so weakens their willingness to accept most
of the burden of moving their community to more
efficient outcomes. From the perspective of our
findings, at the very least, such a policy appears to
be unfair. Even a policy that is construed to be
more fair, like a uniform quota, may turn out to
be ineffective if it causes the less advantaged to
make more self-interested choices.
Our results may also have implications for the
effects on local environmental quality of poverty
alleviation programs. Many have argued that con-
fronting rural poverty by enhancing the private
market opportunities of poorer individuals (with
more or better land, better access to credit, or more
education) could lessen the pressure they place on
local natural resources and environmental quality
(Durning, 1989; Leonard, 1985, 1989). However,
our results suggest that those without good private
alternatives seek more cooperative solutions for the
use of shared natural resources and environmental
quality. Thus, government provision of better pri-
vate opportunities to the rural poor may not have
the desired impact on local environmental quality
if these programs reduce the motivation of these
individuals to make more efficient choices concern-
ing their local environments. Further research is
necessary to explore this hypothesis more rigor-
ously.
Since our analysis focused on out-of-equilibrium
outcomes, we had no a priori expectation of how
our heterogeneous groups of subjects would share
the burden of achieving better-than-Nash equi-
librium outcomes. But our results simply invite the
questions: What motivated the less-advantaged
members of the heterogeneous groups to take on
a disproportionate share of the burden of moving
their groups to more efficient outcomes? From the
other perspective, why did not the richer members
of these groups respond as the poorer members did
and make more group-oriented choices? Perhaps
the answers lie in the establishment of behavioral
norms, or notions of equity in sharing the burden.
It is possible that the high-wage members of the
groups, by making choices that put less pressure on
the environment, signaled a standard of restraint
that the low-wage subjects felt compelled to emu-
late. It is also possible that the high-wage members,
because they made less damaging choices, felt that
they were doing their ‘fair share’ to protect the
environment, and hence, were not motivated to do
more than what was indicated by their purely
self-interested Nash strategies. As plausible as these
conjectures are, they probably do more to suggest
further research than to explain how economic
inequality affects burden-sharing in these contexts.
And further analyses are needed to check the
robustness of our results in other contexts. As we
noted in the introduction, further research is neces-
sary to check our results across different natural
resource and environmental dilemmas, as well as
different dimensions of economic inequality. Even
if contrary patterns emerge, we stand to gain
valuable lessons about how communities in the
developing world distribute the burden of con-
fronting local environmental and natural resource
dilemmas, and about how public polices can help
them do so more effectively.
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